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HEALTH CARE REFORM:
IS 1994 THE YEAR?
GAIL R. WILENSKY*
INTRODUCTION
The battle for health care reform has begun in earnest. Last
fall, the President addressed a joint session of Congress and
outlined his vision of reform. Multiple reform bills are under
consideration in Congress.' The President and members of Con-
* Ph.D. Economics, University of Michigan. Dr. Wilensky is a Senior
Fellow at Project HOPE's Center for Health Affairs, Bethesda, Maryland. In
the Bush Administration, Dr. Wilensky served as Deputy Assistant to the
President for Policy Development, specializing in health and welfare issues,
and as Administrator of the Health Care Financing Administration.
This Article is derived in large part from Health Reform: What Will It
Take to Pass?, 13:1 HEALTH Ar. 179 (1994).
1. In addition to the Clinton Plan, six major health reform initiatives
have been introduced in the 103rd Congress. The Senate Republican Health
Care Task Force proposes to require employers with less than 100 employees
to participate in a purchasing cooperative, mandate individuals to have health
insurance with a penalty for non-compliance, and eliminate pre-existing con-
ditions exclusions. H.R. 3704 & S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Chafee/
Thomas bill).
The proposed "Managed Competition Act of 1993" would encourage the
formation of health plan purchasing cooperatives to negotiate health plans for
coverage on behalf of employers with fewer than 100 employees. The bill
would also establish a basic benefits package, limit the deductibility of health
plans to the least expensive cost of the package, and encourage the formation
of accountable health plans. H.R. 3222 & S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) (Cooper/Grandy/Breaux/Durenburger bill) [hereinafter Cooper/Grandy
bill].
Incremental reforms are the hallmarks of the "Action Now on Health
Care Reform Act of 1993." This bill would implement small group insurance
reforms, expand the Medicare program, and provide individuals with tax
incentives to save for medical expenses through "medical IRAs." H.R. 3080
& S. 1533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Michel/Lott bill).
The "American Health Security Act" would establish a single-payer,
Canadian-style government system of health care. The bill would replace
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gress have held town meetings across the country; newspaper
and television advertisements on reform have appeared with
increasing frequency; and there have been hundreds of meetings
on health care reform in the past year. But despite all of the
activity, we remain in the early stages of what will be a difficult
and contentious period. The Clinton Administration clearly hopes
that the result will be health care legislation in 1994, but that
outcome is far from certain. While the President has indicated
a willingness to be flexible in negotiating legislative language as
long as the resulting bill provides for universal coverage, 2 the
requirement for universal coverage in itself has far-reaching
implications.
In order to pass health care legislation, Congress will need to
form a majority coalition that, from all indications, does not
currently exist. If such a coalition can be built, it is as yet
unclear whether the coalition will be to the right of center, as
was the case for the recently passed North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),3 or whether it will be to the left of center,
Medicare, Medicaid, and most private health insurance with a government-
run system administered at the state level. It would also establish a national
health board to set a national health budget based on annual health costs,
and be financed through a variety of new taxes. H.R. 1200 & S. 491, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (McDermott/Wellstone bill).
The "Health Care Cost Containment and Reform Act" would establish
annual budgets based on prior year national health expenditures, with the rate
of growth limited to the growth of GDP. The government would establish
rates for all personal health services, set national standards for health insurance
plans, expand benefits under Medicare and Medicaid, and establish a new
federal program to provide health insurance to all children under age 19. H.R.
200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Stark bill).
Under the "Consumer Choice Health Security Act of 1993," individual
medical savings accounts would be funded by current employer and employee
contributions for the purchase of a $3000 deductible catastrophic insurance
policy. Pre-existing condition exclusions would be prohibited, but additional
charges of up to 150% of the average premium would be permitted. H.R.
3698 & S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Nickels/Stearns bill).
2. In his 1994 State of the Union Address, President Clinton stated:
I want to make this very clear. I am open - as I have said
repeatedly - to the best ideas of concerned members of both
parties. I have no special brief for any specific approach even in
our own bill except this: If you send me legislation that does not
guarantee every American private health insurance that can never
be taken away, you will force me to take this pen, veto the
legislation and we'll come back here and start all over again.
State of the Union: Excerpts from President Clinton's Message on State of
the Union, N.Y. Tums, Jan. 26, 1994, at A16. See also Robert Pear, U.S.
Officials Hint at New Flexibility Over Health Plan, N.Y. TIms, Jan. 27,
1994, at Al.
3. Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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as was true for the Economic Plan passed in August 1993. 4 In
the past, Conservative Democrats have tended to agree more
with mainstream Republicans than with their own Democratic
leadership. Whether they do so in the future will be a key factor
in determining whether a majority coalition can form, and if
so, whether it will be right or left of center.
The reason that passage is so uncertain and the direction of
a winning coalition unknown is that members of Congress have
not yet reached agreements on the most fundamental issues of
health care reform. These issues include: whether to moderate
spending by market mechanisms or by direct price and spending
controls; whether to assure access to coverage or to assure
coverage itself; and if the latter, whether to do so by employer
mandates, individual mandates, or by government entitlement.
Each of these issues is directly affected by the amount of
government intervention in the organization and delivery of
health insurance and health care.
If the only choice is between "big bang" health care reform, s
such as the Clinton Plan, and nothing, it will be nothing.
However, legislation is more likely if it is politically possible to
fashion a more modest package of reforms that does not involve
mandates, spending limits, or big entitlement cuts. Were 1994
not an election year, legislation would be unlikely because of
continuing divisions over fundamental issues and vision. Ulti-
mately, the willingness of Congress to pass whatever the majority-
can agree to, even if it includes less than what appear to be the
President's minimum requirements, will determine the fate of
health care reform in 1994.
I. TIn CLINTON PLAN
The principal forces driving reform are the ballooning costs
of health care, the large number of uninsured Americans, and
the increasing number of insecure Americans who are insured.
Yet enormous changes are proposed in the Clinton Plan that
have little directly to do with providing insurance to 37 million
uninsured Americans, 6 or with providing health security to the
4. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107
Stat. 312 (1993).
5. "Big bang" health care reform is characterized by large spending
increases or large, painful redistributions of existing spending. See, e.g.,
Richard L. Berke, Clinton is Facing State Resistance on Health Plan, N.Y.
TimEs, Aug. 15, 1993, at I (citing South Carolina Gov. Campbell's criticism
of Clinton Plan as following a "big bang strategy"); William Raspberry,
Health Reform: The Big Bang Theory, WAsH. PosT, May 5, 1993, at A21.
6. Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA
19941
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remaining 215 million Americans. Rather, the top-down restruc-
turing of the health care system reflects the Clinton Adminis-
tration's predilection toward an interventionist government, which
will reconfigure the way health care is financed, organized, and
delivered in the United States. This view is fueled by the belief
that such intervention will ultimately result in a better health
care system, an opinion not held by this author.
President Clinton's proposed Health Security Act 7 promises
all Americans a generous basic benefits package, comparable to
the benefits of Fortune 500 firms. Employed people will have
80 percent of the plan cost funded by their employer8 and will
be responsible for choosing among a set of government-approved
plans;9 they must pay for the remaining 20 percent. 10 Small
employers with fewer than 75 employees and an average wage
of less than $24,000 will receive subsidies from the government
to help finance the employers' share of the costs." Self-employed
and unemployed individuals, including the cash assistance Med-
icaid population, will choose from the same set of approved
government plans. If these individuals are poor or low income, 12
they will receive sliding scale subsidies from the government; 1
otherwise, they will be required to pay the full cost of the plan
themselves.14
Major new benefits have been promised to the elderly and
early retirees. In addition to maintaining their existing Medicare
benefits, the elderly will receive a new prescription drug benefit 5
and a limited home care benefit. 16 Early retirees, those who
retire between the ages of 55 and 64, will be able to choose
from the same set of plans as employees, with the government
financing 80 percent of the cost of the plan. 7
2491, 2491 (1991) (citing estimates of 31-36 million uninsured Americans);
Katharine R. Levit et al., Americans' Health Insurance Coverage, 1980-91,
14:1 HEALTH CAPE FIN. REv. 31, 33 (1992) (estimating 34.7 million uninsured
Americans in 1991, or 14% of the U.S. population).
7. H.R. 3600 & S. 1757, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Clinton
Plan].
8. Id. §§ 6121-6122.
9. Id. § 1002(a).
10. Id. §§ 6101-6103.
11. Id. § 6123.
12. Poor and low-income individuals are those with earnings below 150%
of the federal poverty line. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 3172.
13. Id. § 6104.
14. Id. § 6101.
15. Id. §§ 2001-2009.
16. Id. §§ 2101-2109.
17, Clinton Plan, supra note 7, §§ 6114, 6103.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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The health plan is funded by a tobacco tax, 8 a community
rating system, 9 highly optimistic spending reductions in Medi-
care and Medicaid, 20 and limits on premium increases in the
private sector.2' The latter, among other effects, is assumed to
lead to increased taxable wages and thus to increased personal
income collections.
II. STRENGTHS OF THE CLINTON PLAN
The major strength of the Clinton Plan is a clear commitment
to the concept of universal coverage, with a set of policy
mechanisms for achieving that coverage. It clearly reflects the
Administration's vision of what an improved health care system
should look like and provides a set of policies for achieving
that vision. This consistency between vision and mechanisms to
achieve the vision should be regarded as a strength, even by
those who reject the vision being proposed.
The Clinton Plan also contains a set of subsidiary reforms
that are both highly desirable and common to most other health
care proposals. These include: the elimination of preexisting
condition clauses in insurance coverage;" strategies for reducing
paperwork and administrative tasks associated with inconsistent
forms and billing;23 the provision of needed information on
outcomes and quality for specific plans and providers; 24 limited
tort reform;" and the beginnings of a risk-adjustment process.2 6
An additional strength is the clear commitment of the Clinton
Administration to regard health care reform as a high-priority
domestic policy goal. This is reflected in the frequent direct
references to health care reform, the appointment of First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton as the Administration's point person
on health care, the Presidential address to a joint session of
Congress in September 1993, and the Clintons' personal delivery
of legislative language in October 1993.
III. CoNcERDNs ABOUT THE CLINTON PLAN
Reforming health care is not an easy task. Most Americans
like the quality and easy availability associated with the current
18. Id. §§ 7111-7113.
19. Id. §§ 1384, 1403. The community rating system shifts large amounts
of money from younger, healthier workers in lower cost areas to older, sicker
workers and retirees in higher cost areas. It accomplishes this by charging the
same premium to all people living within a given geographic region.
20. Id. at tit. IV, subtit. B.
21. Id. § 6011.
22. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 1402.
23. Id. § 5130.
24. Id. §§ 5001-5013.
25. Id. §§ 5301-5306.
26. Id. §§ 1541-1545.
1994]
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health care system and would like to see everyone with good
health care, but they mistrust centralized government services
and are reluctant to pay any higher taxes. 27 The Clinton Ad-
ministration has made the difficult task of health care reform
even more difficult by promising major new benefits - to the
elderly, early retirees, the uninsured, the unemployed, and the
poorly insured - at a time when the American public is cynical
about its politicians and is in no mood for broad-based tax
increases, especially in light of the new economic plan.2 The
President has promised too much, too quickly, and to too many,
without credible financing. The most serious weaknesses of the
plan include: the use of spending limits and premium caps;
employer mandates; the administration of health care through
a bureaucratic National Health Board and regional alliances;
and questionable financing strategies.
A. Spending Limits and Premium Caps
The most serious issue that needs to be resolved involves the
use of spending limits and premium caps. The Clinton Admin-
istration says that its plan uses market forces and relies on
market-based incentives, but in fact it uses direct control regu-
latory mechanisms to control spending. The Administration's
actions reflect its fundamental distrust of markets and its greater
level of comfort with regulated systems. Although other coun-
tries have attempted to control spending by using spending limits
and price controls in addition to limiting the use and availability
of expensive technologies, 29 the use of price controls in the
United States has been unsuccessful. Our experience with price
controls in World War II, the wage and price controls of the
Nixon era, and the Medicare fee freezes of the 1980s were short
lived and followed by inflationary surges. The use of price
controls (the less polite name for Clinton's premium caps) will
27. See Lawrence R. Jacobs & Robert Y. Shapiro, Public Opinion's Tilt
Against Private Enterprise, 13:1 HEALTH An. 285, 294 (1994).
28. According to a March 1994 poll, approximately 70% of Americans
think that the amount they will pay for medical care under the Clinton Plan
will increase. George J. Church, Oh Noooo! The Public Grows Fearful of
Clinton's Plan and Shows Little Faith in Alternatives, TiME, March 14, 1994,
at 34-35.
29. For example, in Germany, the increase in expenditures for certain
kinds of health care is tied directly to the wages of members of their sickness
fund. See generally Klaus-Dirk Henke, Response, 11 HEALTH CARE FrN. REv.
93 (1989 Supp.); John K. Iglehart, Germany's Health Care System, 324 NEw.
ENG. J. MED. 503, 503-08 (1991); Deborah A. Stone, Health Care Cost
Containment in West Germany, 4 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 176, 176-99
(1979).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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establish prevailing prices rather than serve as a so-called safety
net. The use of Medicare diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and
other forms of government-set prices has shown that whenever
government sets a maximum allowed price, it becomes the
prevailing price even though providers could always compete
beneath this established price.30
The use of spending limits and price controls also is an area
where conservative Democrats tend to align themselves more
with mainstream Republicans than with their own Democratic
leadership. While it would be possible to eliminate this aspect
of the health care plan, to do so would put several other key
elements of the plan at risk. For instance, Democratic support
of the sharp reductions in Medicare spending required the use
of spending limits in the private sector. Removing the spending
limits in the private sector would make the Administration
vulnerable to charges of massive cost shifting to the private
sector, an issue of particular concern to its congressional sup-
porters. It also would remove the Administration's estimated
increase in personal income tax receipts, which is being used to
finance some of the benefit expansions. Thus, removing private-
sector spending limits would severely jeopardize the plan's fund-
ing.
In addition to the practical problems of jettisoning these
provisions of the plan, philosophic issues are at stake as well.
There are only two ways to get spending "right": reliance on
spending limits and price controls, or reliance on market forces.
The Administration's dilemma in part reflects a split in the
Democratic Party, which is particularly pronounced on health
care matters. A sizeable minority distrusts major government
intrusions in price setting and spending decisions. However, the
majority is uncomfortable with market forces, believing that
they have been ineffective at controlling spending in the past
and will continue to be ineffective in the future. This has led
the Administration to keep a foot in both camps. The political
right, however, recognizes premium caps and spending limits as
the regulatory mechanisms they are.
B. Employer Mandates
The second most serious issue involves the use of employer
mandates. The Administration has proposed to guarantee uni-
30. See generally Kathryn Langwell, Price Controls: On the One Hand
... And on the Other, 14:3 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 5, 6-9 (1993) (discussing
potential impact of health care pricing controls); James A. Morone & Andrew
B. Dunham, Slouching Towards National Health Insurance: The New Health
Care Politics, 2 YALE J. oN REG. 263, 274-80 (1985) (describing history and
microeconomic impact of DRGs).
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versal coverage by requiring employers to finance eighty percent
of the average price of the health care plan in their region3' and
by requiring employees to purchase a plan and pay the differ-
ence.32 Others are assured coverage by selecting a plan from the
alliance and receiving various levels of subsidies, depending on
their income. 33
This type of employer mandate is very unusual because the
employer is not actually required to provide health insurance
coverage, but rather to serve as a mandatory financial conduit
to the health alliance. As a result, many businesses are objecting
that employers are being removed from involvement in negoti-
ating health care networks and prices at a time when they have
become most active in this area. Furthermore, employers are
being replaced by institutional entities that do not yet exist. Use
of the employer mandate also has raised concerns about the
future viability of small businesses and the potential impact of
the mandate on low-wage employees. An effort to limit these
adverse effects led to the proposed use of subsidies to low-wage
small businesses. 34 As a result, there are growing concerns about
the resulting economic distortions as firms attempt to maximize
their subsidies.
Many people, but especially Republicans and conservative
economists, have questioned whether employer mandates will
result in substantial job loss for low-income workers and eco-
nomic failure for new small businesses. Most economists agree
that there will be some job loss, but they disagree on the
magnitude. Job loss from mandates has been estimated to be
as small as 200,000 and as large as 3 million. 5 The latter
estimate, however, reflects a mandate that does not provide
subsidies to small, low-wage firms and therefore cannot be
directly attributable to a proposal such as the Administration's. 36
Most economists believe that as long as money wages can adjust
demand to reflect the effect of the employer mandate, the
amount of job loss will be relatively small. Estimated job losses
in the range of 500,000 to 1 million seem most probable.
However, substantial economic distortions could occur as small
firms attempt to reconfigure themselves to take maximum ad-
31. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, §§ 6121-6122.
32. Id. § 1002(a), §§ 6101-6103.
33. Id. § 6104.
34. Id. § 6123.
35. Steven Greenhouse, Clinton's Health Plan: Job Losses in Health Plan
Are Denied, N.Y. Tndas, Sept. 28, 1993, at BIO (citing government estimates
of 200,000 to 700,000 jobs lost, and Employment Policies Institute estimate
of 3.1 million jobs lost).
36. Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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vantage of the subsidies being paid to firms with both fewer
than 75 employees and an average annual wage of less than
$24,000.37 Alan Krueger has estimated that these distortions
could cost upwards of $10 billion, which is the equivalent of
about 1 million jobs lost.3 8
The various concerns about employer mandates have led to
some proposals that rely on individual mandates rather than
employer mandates, 9 and to other proposals that do not require
employers to finance the purchase of insurance but only to make
group purchase of insurance available to employees. 40 Many
believe that an individual mandate has certain advantages: it
reduces the economic distortions of the Clinton proposal; it
allows government to target subsidies more efficiently to indi-
viduals who are believed to need subsidization; and it removes
the political concerns regarding mandates on employers. On the
other hand, there is a fear that reliance on individual mandates
would appear harsh, would represent too much change from
the current system, and might cost too much money if the
middle class demands costly subsidies after realizing that they
and not their employers pay for their health care. The lack of
a mandate on either the employer or the individual, however,
would require some persons to be uninsured, thus violating the
Administration's primary requirement for health care reform:
universal coverage.
Employer mandates do not represent as fundamental or di-
visive an issue as that of spending limits and price controls, but
resolution of the issue will be contentious nonetheless. The
opinion of the business community tends to be split between
large employers, which generally provide broad health coverage
and have been less concerned about employer mandates, and
smaller employers, which tend to be opposed to employer man-
dates unless they are heavily subsidized. The opposition to the
Clinton Plan by the Business Roundtable, 41 the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce,42 and the National Association of Manufactur-
ers, 43 however, indicates that even businesses that may not be
37. Clinton Health Plan, supra note 7, § 6123.
38. Interview with Alan B. Kreuger, Professor of Economics & Public
Affairs, Princeton University (Nov. 10, 1993).
39. H.R. 3704 & S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Chafee/Thomas
bill); S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Nickels bill).
40. H.R. 3222 & S. 1579, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Cooper/Grandy
bill).
41. Adam Clymer, Powerful Business Group Backs Rival to President's
Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1994, at Al.
42. Robert Pear, Business Groups and Labor Unions Attack Clinton on
Health Plan, N.Y. Tim~s, Feb. 4, 1994, at A19.
43. Louis Uchitelle, Manufacturers Oppose Clinton Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
6, 1994, at A26.
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directly impacted by the employer mandate" may be concerned
about the amount of government intervention and intrusion
represented by the bill. Not surprisingly, the National Federation
of Independent Business, which is made up primarily of very
small businesses that do not offer insurance, has been opposed
to the bill and all forms of employer mandates. 45 It may be
possible to alleviate some of this opposition by requiring busi-
nesses to offer access to group insurance and either not speci-
fying the employers' contribution or lowering the required
employer contribution. Other options include implementing the
requirement gradually over time or limiting it to the larger
employers. However, these options will probably not be over-
whelmingly appealing either to business or to those members of
Congress who staunchly support employer mandates.
Employer mandates are one of many areas where the public
has displayed conflicting views. For the past several years,
polling data has shown that the public supports the concept of
an employer mandate, with approval rates ranging from 52 to
67 percent. 6 But polling data also has shown that the public
withdraws that support if the mandate is assumed to cost jobs
(which it will, although the magnitude of job loss is subject to
dispute). 47 Furthermore, an October 1993 poll indicated that a
large number of people support the notion of "business en-
couraging the provision of health insurance," although it is
unclear what the public thinks this phrase means.48
The rate of change in health care spending will also have an
effect on the economy. Many reform proposals seek to reduce
spending both by improving incentives for purchasers to be more
cost-conscious and by pushing for more efficient provision of
services. However, if we are successful in reducing paperwork,
in decreasing the number of small insurance companies that
have excluded medium- to high-risk persons, or in downsizing
the hospital sector, we also will reduce employment in each of
these areas. The economic dislocation from such changes will
depend in large part on both the speed with which such changes
occur and the size of the reduction. If we were to accomplish
44. The vast majority of these organizations' business members already
provide health insurance.
45. Steven Greenhouse, Small-Business Group in No Mood to Relent on
Opposition to Health Plan, N.Y. TmEs, Sept. 17, 1993, at A20.
46. See Gail R. Wilensky, Health Reform: What Will It Take to Pass?,
13:1 HEALTH Ars. 179, 183, 191 n.2 (1994).
47. Bitter Pill on Health Care, USA TODAY, Dec. 17, 1992, at 12A (citing
Kaiser Family Foundation Poll finding that "fo]nly 30% favor making em-
ployers provide health insurance if the added cost would cost jobs.").
48. Wilensky, supra note 46, at 183, 191 n.3.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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the spending goals of the Administration, there would be sharp
reductions in hospital spending and in the existing administrative
structure associated with health care. 49 Substantial numbers of
relatively low-wage, low-skill workers are employed in the health
care sector, and absorption of these workers into the economy
will take some time. This is not an argument for maintaining
the status quo in health care, but rather a recognition that
sudden changes in spending can produce local distortions and
dislocations that would be difficult to accommodate. In addition,
these changes are not easily compensated for by increased spend-
ing elsewhere, even in different sectors of the health care in-
dustry.
The economic effects of the President's health care reform
proposal must be considered in the context of other recently
adopted or proposed policies of the Clinton Administration. For
example, Labor Secretary Robert Reich recently proposed and
subsequently withdrew a fifty-cent-per-hour increase in the min-
imum wage.50 Any increase in the minimum wage, on top of
the increased spending implied by an employer mandate, would
exacerbate concerns about potential effects on low-wage work-
ers. Furthermore, the increase in marginal tax rates passed in
August 1993 will affect some successful small businesses. Ap-
proximately forty percent of all U.S. businesses file tax returns
as subchapter S corporations5' - that is, they file as individuals.
Those that have been financially successful are at risk of having
an increase in their marginal tax rate. When combined with
changes resulting from an employer mandate, this could have
cumulative effects on the economy.
C. National Health Board and Regional Alliances
The Clinton Plan proposes powerful new bureaucracies, while
giving new regulatory powers to existing bureaucracies such as
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The
new entities include a National Health Boardsr with powers to
set per capita spending, 3 allocate the per capita spending to the
49. It should be noted, however, that sharp reductions in the existing
administrative structure could lead to potentially large increases in other
administrative costs such as those involved in the bureaucracies of Health
Alliances.
50. Michael Arndt, Clinton Backpedals on Minimum Wage Hike, Cm.
TRm., Jan. 20, 1994, at 1.
51. In 1990, 3,716,650 corporations filed income tax returns. Of those,
1,575,092, or 42%, were subchapter S corporate returns. INTERNAL REV. SERV.,
STATISTICS OF INCOME - 1990 CORPORATION INCOME TAx RETURNs 4 (1993).
52. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 1501.
53. Id. § 6002.
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states,54 review and provide oversight for prices of breakthrough
therapeutics, 5 and assume the functions of health alliances that
are not performing in a satisfactory manner.16 The proposal also
establishes mandatory monopoly purchasing groups: the regional
health alliances.57
Purchasing groups, which are an important part of almost all
health care reform proposals and are used to provide market
power to small firms and individuals, are used in the Clinton
Plan for purposes that extend far beyond the necessary norms.
The Administration's purchasing groups have strong oversight
powers to implement the directives of the National Health
Board. These directives include: deciding where people will enroll
if their health plans are oversubscribed; 8 setting provider fee
schedules for fee-for-service providers; 9 establishing information
requirements for plans that will be allowed to market in their
areas;60 negotiating and enforcing premium caps; 6' and enforcing
the mandatory participation of individuals. 62
The problems with use of these highly regulatory entities,
however, are not nearly as difficult to resolve as are the problems
mentioned above. Most health care reform proposals use the
concepts of national health care boards and purchasing groups,
even if they do not have the regulatory power that is assumed
in the Clinton proposal. If employers and individuals must offer
or obtain health insurance, some entity must decide what that
health insurance package needs to include. This means that there
is a need for a health care board of some sort. In addition,
many proposals recognize the value of purchasing groups as a
way to give small firms and individuals better market leverage
for their health care dollar.
Thus, while the precise functions of a national health care
board and health alliances will be subject to negotiation and
change, their fundamental concepts are not the subject of con-
troversy as is the case for spending limits, price controls, or
employer mandates. Most policy analysts believe that ultimately
there will be a national health board of some sort, although
one with far less regulatory power than has been envisioned
under the Clinton Plan. They also believe that there will be
54. Id. § 6003.
55. Id. § 1503(i).
56. Id. § 1512.
57. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, §§ 1301-1303, 1321.
58. Id. § 1323(f).
59. Id. § 1322(c).
60. Id. § 1325.
61. Id. § 1321.
62. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 1323.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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health alliances or purchasing groups, although it is unclear
whether these will be voluntary or mandatory.
D. Questionable Financing Strategies
The final set of concerns relate to the proposed financing and
the accuracy of the spending and savings estimates. By promising
major new benefits to both the uninsured and the insured, the
Administration has put itself under enormous fiscal pressure.
Its response has been to propose historic reductions in Medicare
and Medicaid, and to couple these reductions in public programs
with a very tight premium cap for the private sector. Ultimately,
savings can only come from: (1) paying providers less; (2)
providing less in the way of quantity or quality of services; or
(3) finding ways to increase the efficiency with which health
care is provided. Although the Administration nominally invokes
the third option, most of the savings under the Clinton Plan
would come from paying various providers less.
The largest source of funds to finance the Clinton Plan comes
from reductions in Medicare and Medicaid spending. The Ad-
ministration proposes a reduction of $118 billion in Medicare
program spending over the next five years. This amount is in
addition to the $56 billion in reductions that was included in
the economic plan passed by Congress in 1993.63 Thus, the
Administration is proposing a $174 billion reduction in Medicare
by reducing payments to providers.
The Medicare reductions involve approximately twenty-eight
specific payment changes that range from reductions in hospital
update factor" and reductions in payments for capital 5 to
changes in hospital outpatient department payments 66 and in
physician reimbursement. 67 While a few changes could be viewed
as attempts to produce savings by affecting use, 68 the vast
majority of savings occur because of reductions in provider
payments. These reductions will affect the availability of services
to the elderly as providers respond to reductions in funding and
restructure how they provide services. In addition, these reduc-
tions will further exacerbate the schism between a price-con-
63. Wilensky, supra note 46, at 185.
64. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 4101.
65. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 4103. The reductions account for
approximately $28 billion in savings. Wilensky, supra note 46, at 186.
66. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 4116.
67. E.g., id. §§ 4113-4114. The changes will result in an additional $25
billion in savings. Wilensky, supra note 46, at 186.
68. Examples of savings produced by affecting use include changing the
coinsurance rate for home health agencies, Clinton Plan, supra note 7, §§
4133-4134, and establishing coinsurance for laboratory services, id. § 4117.
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trolled Medicare system 69 and a managed care-oriented system
for the non-elderly °
The heavy reliance on reductions in provider payments -
both in the financing of the Clinton health care reform package
and in the changes included in the economic plan - makes
these Medicare reductions both politically unlikely and substan-
tively questionable. The Administration had a difficult time
convincing a majority in Congress to agree to the $56 billion
reduction in August 1993. The likelihood of persuading an
uneasy Congress to add $124 billion of Medicare reductions in
an election year seems remote.71
The Administration also proposes several changes to the Med-
icaid program. The disproportionate-share payment program, 72
which has been a major source of Medicaid spending growth,
would be eliminated2 3 In its place, the Clinton Plan would
reserve a small amount of funding for hospitals treating large
numbers of low-income persons.74 This is a reasonable proposal
because the justification for the disproportionate-share program
was to finance the costs of treating large numbers of low-income
uninsured persons, which will no longer be an issue under the
Clinton proposal. Eliminating disproportionate-share payments
or making this amount of money available to the states under
flexible guidelines are elements of many other health care reform
proposals.
The remaining Medicaid reductions are more problematic. The
Administration assumes that health alliances will be able to
provide Medicaid services at ninety-five percent of what would
have been paid if the cash-eligible beneficiaries were still on
69. In a price-controlled Medicare system, providers can attempt to com-
pensate for low payments by increasing volume.
70. In a managed care-oriented system, providers respond to funding
reductions by limiting non-essential services. See generally Alain C. Enthoven,
The History and Principles of Management Competition, 12 HEALTH Are. 24
(Supp. 1993); ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MANAGED
COMPETITION IN HEALTH CARE FINANCE (1988).
71. There certainly is potential for reducing Medicare spending. However,
removing $174 billion of projected spending over a five-year period, while
promising the same service level, would be a serious mistake unless the elderly
understand how it will affect the level and availability of their health care.
Furthermore, financing new benefits for the elderly in light of the proposed
reductions will only exacerbate Medicare's current fiscal fragility.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F), 1396a(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Under the disproportionate share program, hospitals serving a disproportionate
number of uninsured, poor individuals who are ineligible for Medicaid will
receive federally-funded state Medicaid dollars.
73. Clinton Plan, supra note 7, § 4231.
74. Id. § 4104.
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Medicaid. 71 In addition, those who have been on Medicaid will
be subject to a stringent cap placed on their spending growth,
as these persons will now be part of the health alliance and thus
subject to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) cap on payments. 76
Federal savings of $85 billion are also assumed as a result of
the shift to employer-mandated Medicaid coverage, with the
states being required to continue their current financial efforts
on behalf of the noncash Medicaid population.7 7 These savings
seem unreasonably high, but it is difficult to criticize these
estimates until more information is known as to how precisely
these calculations were made.
The adequacy of the Administration's financing estimates and
the issue of whether the financing is adequate to support the
promised benefits is a matter to be resolved by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO). Under existing budget rules, new benefits
can be enacted only if new funding sources are identified or
existing spending levels reduced, and these spending and financ-
ing estimates are approved by the CBO. But if history is any
guide, these estimates will be wrong, and they will be wrong in
one direction: government spending will be underestimated and
government savings will be overestimated.
A few examples of our inability to accurately forecast expen-
ditures associated with new benefits illustrate this point.
The most glaring underestimation concerns Medicare itself.
Passed in 1965, the Hospital Insurance component was estimated
to cost $9 billion by 1990; actual costs were $67 billion.7 1 More
recent underestimations are exemplified by the Medicare Cata-
strophic Legislation savings attributed to the 1990 Budget Act.79
Most of the Catastrophic program was never in place long
enough to assess the accuracy of the projections, but one part
that was assessed concerned the removal of a three-day hospital
stay requirement before Medicare would pay for nursing home
care. The cost of this change was independently estimated by
75. Wilensky, supra note 46, at 187.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Estimated amount is from Committee on Ways and Means, Actuarial
Cost Estimates and Summary of Provisions of the Old-Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance System as Modified by the Social Security Amendments
of 1965 and Actuarial Cost Estimates and Summary of Provisions of the
Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance Systems as Estab-
lished by Such Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97. The actual amount is from the 1993
Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund. It should be noted that no long-term estimates were made for
the Supplemental Medical Insurance component.
79. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
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the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) and the CBO
at $150 million per year.80 During the one year that the change
was in effect, the provision was estimated to have cost $1.4
billion."' This means that both HCFA and the CBO were off
by a factor of nine in a program change for which adequate
information was believed to exist for an accurate prediction.
The 1990 budget deal was expected to reduce Medicare and
Medicaid spending by about $40 billion. Within months of the
agreement, however, it was clear that rather than a reduction,
there would be a net increase in spending of at least $60 billion
within the relevant time frame of the budget deal. In fact,
technical revisions to the 1990 Budget Act have now added
about $190 billion of spending to that agreement.82 This history,
combined with specific concerns about the Medicare and Med-
icaid reductions, has led to overwhelming skepticism about the
claims of conservative estimates of funding health care reform.
As a result of the concern over the financing estimates, a
number of proposals involve a "spend-as-you-save" or "pay-
as-you-save" provision.8 3 This is an attempt to recognize that
despite the best efforts at projecting expenditures or savings in
policy changes, only after changes are implemented will it be
known how much has been spent or saved. Given the size of
the health care sector, such a provision has been suggested as a
way to limit the damage that major changes otherwise could
impose on the federal deficit. If not a "pay-as-you-save" pro-
vision, some attempt to limit future government financial ex-
posure may be needed if the legislation is to be supported by
the more conservative members of Congress.
IV. Ti-m PoLITics OF HEALTH CuE REFORM
In assessing the politics of health care reform, the usual
approach is to outline areas with the greatest differences between
the Democrats and the Republicans. While this remains impor-
tant, the more significant split is within the Democratic Party
itself. Conservative Democrats and mainstream Republicans tend
to agree on some of the most fundamental issues: opposing
spending limits, price controls, employer mandates, and sharing
80. Original estimates were contained in the 1989 Mid-Session Review
budget documentation. Actual outlays were contained in the unpublished
budget documentation for the fiscal year 1994 President's Budget.
81. Id.
82. Telephone interview with Timothy Muds, former Associate Director,
Office of Management and Budget (Sept. 1993).
83. See, e.g., H.R. 3704 & S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Chafee/
Thomas bill).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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a distrust of government intrusion in the marketplace. Of course,
significant splits exist within the Republican ranks as well.
A. Democratic Divisions
To understand the magnitude of the divisions within the
Democratic Party, it is instructive to recall the summer of 1992.
This was a time when partisan Democrats would have dearly
loved to embarrass a weakened Republican president by passing
health care reform legislation that they knew he would be forced
to veto. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Me.) was
advocating Health America,8" a bill that incorporated spending
limits, price controls, and employer mandates; it was cospon-
sored in the Senate by Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), Jay
Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), and Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D-Mich.).
But Health America never went to the floor of the Senate
because it was clear that it did not have the fifty-one votes
required for passage. In the House, the Health Cost Contain-
ment and Reform Act of 1992,85 cosponsored by Fortney (Pete)
Stark (D-Cal.) and Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.), also contained
spending limits, price controls, and employer mandates. It too
was never brought to the House floor, for while substantial
efforts were made to garner the 218 votes needed for passage,
it was clear that it would not pass. This was a time when there
were ten more Democrats in the House and one more Democrat
in the Senate than in 1994. Thus, even when the legislation
would have been "for show" in that the President would have
vetoed it, there was enough division within the Democratic Party
to prevent passage of the legislation containing the most critical
elements of the Clinton Administration's health care plan.
This division between conservative Democrats and party lead-
ership is complicated by the existence of a third group - the
single-payer group. This group is led by Rep. Jim McDermott
(D-Wash.) and has almost 90 members in the House, but only
2 or 3 supporters in the Senate. The Democratic leadership
group, which wants universal coverage through an employer
mandate and spending limits with price controls, includes about
110 supporters in the House and about 40 in the Senate. The
conservative Democratic forum in the House is more easily
identified and has 60 to 70 members. The conservative Demo-
crats in the Senate are a less identifiable group made up of 8
to 10 senators. These conservative Democrats do not want
employer mandates, may or may not support individual man-
84. S. 1227, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992).
85. H.R. 5502, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
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dates, want reliance on market forces, and are against total
private-sector spending limits.
B. Republican Divisions
Within the Republican Party there are three identifiable groups.
One group, which includes the House leadership and a majority
of House Republicans, favors incremental changes such as in-
surance reform; administrative simplification; tort reform; more
flexibility for the states regarding Medicaid; full tax-deductibility
of premiums for the self-employed; the option of a medical
savings account instead of the tax exclusion of employer-pro-
vided insurance; and small additional investments in community
health centers and rural health centers. A second group, includ-
ing 25 House Republicans and 20-25 Senate Republicans, wants
a less regulatory type of managed competition, involving indi-
vidual mandates or no mandates rather than employer mandates,
no overall spending limits or price controls, and either voluntary
purchasing groups or mandatory purchasing groups that are
limited to small firms. A third set of Republicans wants indi-
vidual vouchers or tax deductions with medical spending ac-
counts, either with the incremental reform that the first group
of Republicans favors or otherwise strong encouragement to
have some type of insurance. There is a substantial amount of
diversity within this third group, but they number 25 to 30 in
the Senate (some of whom also sponsored the less regulatory
managed care legislation) and at least 25 in the House.
C. Forging Alliances
The big unknown is what it would take to bring these camps
together and whether it will occur in time for passage of some
legislation in the 103rd Congress. At the moment, the dynamic
appears to be moving toward the more moderate group of
Democrats and Republicans. This group's preference is embod-
ied in both the Cooper/Grandy bill86 and the Chafee bill.17 The
former has neither a mandate on employers or employees nor
spending limits, but is otherwise a managed competition struc-
ture. The Chafee bill has an individual mandate, steep Medicare
cuts, voluntary purchasing groups, and no spending limits. Both
bills include a tax cap, however, which will be a significant
impediment to their passage. Unions hate such caps, and because
86. H.R. 3222 & S. 1579, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993) (Cooper/Grandy
bill).
87. H.R. 3704 & S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Chafee/Thomas
bill).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
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President Clinton has already alienated labor with NAFTA, he
may be loath to do it again. Most economists believe that a tax
cap or the substitution of a refundable tax credit for the current
tax exclusion of employer-provided insurance makes eminent
policy sense because it makes purchasers more cost conscious
and is therefore an important element in market-oriented reform.
But a tax cap also translates into a middle-class tax increase or
benefit loss, which causes politicians political heartburn. Because
a tax cap produces tax revenue, there also would be a severe
shortfall if the cap was excluded from legislation. Thus, while
including a tax cap brings a political and financial problem, not
including it does the same.
In addition, guaranteed universal coverage - the repeated
prerequisite for presidential support of any health care reform
plan - requires an individual mandate, an employer mandate,
or universal provision by the government. But employer man-
dates raise concerns, which have already been discussed, about
economic growth and the employment of low-wage workers.
Individual mandates are also of concern because they depart
from current practice and because they sound harsh to indivi-
duals.
It is possible that enough conservative Democrats and/or
Republicans could yield in their opposition to employer man-
dates, particularly if the mandates were triggered over time or
phased in so as to impact only large employers in the beginning.
However, this type of accommodation is unlikely to occur in
1994. Alternatively, the Administration may yield on its universal
coverage requirement and support the Cooper/Grandy bill, which
provides universal access to coverage but not necessarily univer-
sal coverage. This also seems unlikely given the harsh attacks
on this plan by the Administration and its congressional sup-
porters. When more attention is given to the financing strategies
supporting the Cooper/Grandy bill and the cost estimates have
been subjected to CBO scrutiny, it will be more difficult rather
than less difficult to build a majority consensus around this bill.
At present, no such majority support exists.
Were 1994 not an off-year election, there would be little
chance of passing health care reform. However, many members
of Congress have promised health care reform and 435 members
of the House and one-third of the Senate need to return to their
constituents for support and re-election. This may provide a
sufficiently powerful incentive to forge the alliance necessary to
pass some legislation.
The chance of passing legislation would be better if it were
possible to vote on whatever package of reforms can gain
majority support, even if it does not contain universal coverage
or other key components of the Administration's bill. Unfor-
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tunately, the Democratic leadership's prior reluctance to allow
a vote on an incremental reform package will most likely con-
tinue in 1994. Despite the repeated statements by the Adminis-
tration and congressional leadership urging health care reform
in 1994, it may well be that they would prefer no vote if it
would mean voting on a package that deviates in too many
ways from the principles espoused by the Democratic leadership:
universal coverage with a comprehensive package of benefits
and "meaningful" (i.e., direct controlled) cost containment. If
this is true, it is easy to imagine the Democrats' clarion call to
battle for the 1994 election: "Send us more Democrats and we
will give you health care reform." Of course, this would put
tremendous pressure on Democrats to pass something in 1995.
As the party in power most frequently loses seats in an off-year
election, the Democrats may have to accomplish this task with
fewer members than in 1994.
To pass a health care reform bill this session, there will need
to be movement toward a majority consensus no later than the
summer of 1994. The absence of a majority consensus will mean
a stalemate during this session of Congress. In light of the
current situation on Capitol Hill, this is the most likely outcome
for 1994. Although the interest in health care reform is strong,
the near-term passage of legislation is by no means inevitable.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/4
